Barack Obama - MF Global
Jon Corzine has been the Governor of New Jersey, a Senator from New Jersey, and one of the heads of Goldman Sachs. In March of 2010, he took over as CEO of MF Global, a company that had already experienced financial and regulatory problems. During his time there, he invested in the sovereign debt of Europe by purchasing bonds from PIIGS countries after they had been downgraded and anticipating that the European Union would reach a deal and the value of those bonds would increase. The rate that MF Global was required to pay on those bonds fluctuated with MF Global's rating and that of the bonds.
The amount that MF Global was leveraged combined with the sheer size of the $6.3 billion bond purchase and the continuing trouble in Europe caused MF Global to collapse in October of 2011. As that collapse was unfolding, Mr Corzine allegedly used funds from customer segregated accounts to cover margin calls in hopes of fighting off bankruptcy, an act which is illegal. After the collapse, it was revealed that as much as $1.6 billlion in customer funds was missing.
In the months after the collapse, much of the customer funds were retrieved from JP Morgan, the lender for those bonds. The MF Global trustees have asserted that Mr Corzine requested that those customer funds be used. This also means that Mr Corzine committed perjury when he testified to Congress that he was unaware of the transfers or the location of the funds.
In August of 2012, it was reported that the Justice Department would not be pressing charges against MF Global or Jon Corzine. This led many to speculate that the reason for the lack of charges was the close connections between Mr Corzine and AG Eric Holder and Mr Corzine's past as a bundler for President Obama.
In 1994 Mr Corzine became the CEO of Goldman Sachs, a position that he held until 1999. In 2000, Mr Corzine was elected to the US Senate from New Jersey where he remained for one term and did not seek re-election. In 2006, Mr Corzine was elected Governor of New Jersey, where he remained until 2010 when he was defeated by Governor Chris Christie. After he left the Governor's seat, Mr Corzine became CEO of MF Global in March of 2010.
Commodities Exchange Act
Enacted in 1936, the commodities exchange act provides federal regulation for all futures and commodities trading. Specifically, section 4D states that customer funds cannot be comingled with the funds of the futures commission merchant. It is illegal for a company to take funds from a 4D segregated account to pay some other debt.
A "Repo" is a repurchase agreement is the sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase them later. Before 2000, the rule permitted futures brokers to take money from their customers’ accounts and invest it in U.S. government securities. In December 2000, the CFTC agreed to amend Regulation 1.25 “to permit investments in general obligations issued by any enterprise sponsored by the United States, bank certificates of deposit, commercial paper, corporate notes, general obligations of a sovereign nation, and interests in money market mutual funds.” Then, in February 2004 and May 2005, Regulation 1.25 was further amended and refined for firms such as MF Global to do internal repos of customers’ deposits and invest the funds in the “general obligations of a sovereign nation” (Source).
Investment Strategy and MF Global
In March of 2010, Governor Corzine took over at MF Global. It appears that not long after taking over, Mr Corzine oversaw the purchase of bonds from several European countries known as the PIIGS - Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. This began with $1.5 billion, extended to $4 billion, and finally grew to $6.3 billion. By the summer of 2011, the board at MF Global was extremely hesitant towards the moves made by Mr Corzine and while they allowed the previous position on the bonds to remain in place, they did not allow him to accrue any more of these securities.
These bond purchases were financed through a repurchase agreement or “repo”. The bonds paid a higher rate than the loan rate that MF Global would pay to the “repo” lender, therefore MF Global would be making a guaranteed spread equivalent to this difference. When the bonds matured, MF Global would use the bond proceeds to buy back or “repurchase” the bonds from the lender, thus repaying the “repo” loan. For example, JP Morgan took in Spanish bonds as collateral that MF Global had just purchased and made a loan that matured concurrently with the bond maturity date. While the bank would loan most of the money, MF Global would come up with a small amount, such as 1%.
On the surface, the plan was sound. Although the bonds purchased were admittedly "junk," it was widely believed that Europe would take whatever actions were necessary to prevent the collapse of Greece and the other countries. So, if MF Global was able to purchase those bonds at 90% of their face value, Then their profit would be the 5.55% rate of the bond less the .65% loan rate or 4.90%. Given that the bonds purchases were short term - 2 to 5 years - the potential to make money was strong.
The real problem for MF Global was the amount of leverage and investor fears. To get the most out of the European debt deal, Corzine leveraged the company 40 to 1 to purchase as much as possible. As part of the agreement with JP Morgan, the amount of margin MF Global had to pay fluctuated with the price of the bonds or if the credit of the underlying borrower (MF Global) deteriorated.
On October 17, a Wall Street Journal article highlighted a September 1 report that MF Global needed a $183 million capital infusion. This sparked a "run on the bank" scenario where investors stormed MF Global attempting to remove their money before any percieved problems caused them to lose it. On October 24, 2011 Moody’s downgraded MF Global debt to one level above “junk”. One day later MF Global reported a $191 million quarterly loss. The following day, the 26th, Moody’s further downgrade MF Global to Ba2 - solid “junk” territory.
The end result of these downgrades was that MF Global was repeatedly called for more and more margin as both their company credit and the prices of the European bonds deteriorated. MF Global could not meet the margin calls now being placed on it and declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It was known that in the last few days, a few large wire transfers were made from MF Global to JP Morgan.
Acccusations of Illegal Behavior
Even as the firm was collapsing there were accusations of missing customer funds, in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act. In total, it was determined that $1.6 billion was missing from customer accounts and there were immediate accusations that Mr Corzine used those funds to cover some of the last margin calls with JP Morgan in an effort to ward off bankruptcy. Days after the bankruptcy, an investigator with the CME Group asserted that improper behavior was no longer a question of if, but how much money was moved around and how to get it back.
On December 8, 2011 Mr Corzine responded to a Congressional subpeona to testify. He had offered to come in January to allow for more time to look over documentation, but Congress insisted that he come earlier. In that testomony, he flatly asserted that he was not aware of how the customer segregated funds were moved from those accounts or where they were. He stated that he was shocked that funds were moved from customer segregated accounts.
A few days later, the CME Chief testifeid that an employee at MF Global was asserting that Mr Corzine ordered the transfer and was welll aware of the source of the funds. It is believed that this person is the treasrurer for those accounts - Edith O'Brien. Mrs O'Brien testified before Congress in March of 2012 but pleaded the fifth. There are a number of uncomfirmed reports that Mrs O'Brien was seeking immunity before she would testify.
In June of 2012, the trustees for MF Global released their report on what happened in the final days at MF Global. That report found that long before the last few days at MF Global, the company was in violation of rules regarding segregated accounts. While it was allowed to remove some money from those accounts if it paid it back before the end of the day, the company was forced to use ever increasing accounting gimmicks to hide the deficit of money in those accounts.
In the final few days of the company, a number of illegal transactions could be pointed to showing that the activity was intentional and that Mr Corzine had full knowledge. On October 28, 2011 JP Morgan’s Donna Dellosso, a Chief Risk Officer Managing Director at JPM, called Mr Corzine about a shortage of funds in their London account. This shortage was the result of customers leaving the company and increased payments required after MF Global was downgraded. That same day, Corzine instructed Edith O’Brien, to wire JPM the money to clear the overdraft. Mrs O'Brien wired $200 million from the JPM Customer Trust Account to the Treasury House Account and $175 million from the Treasury House Account to a account at JPM London.
When Mrs Dellosso confirmed the transfer, she discovered that the money was taken from the JPM Customer Trust Account. JP Morgan then requested that Mr Corzine provide written confirmation that the transferred money came from its own funds and did not belong to MF Global clients. MF Global responded by asserting that the request was too vague, and JP Morgan then took the money without the signature.
At the time of the trustees report, JPM had returned approximately $89.2 million in customer property and $518.4 million in non-segregated unallocated MF Global assets.
Ties Between Corzine and the Obama Administration
Jon Corzine has a logn relationship with the Obama administration. In 2010, both President Obama and Vice President Biden campaigned for his re-election bid. In those campaign events, both men asserted that Mr Corzine was the first one they called when they needed financial advice for nation. They also credited Mr Corzine with the stimulus strategy going into 2009.
Mr Corzine has acted as a campaign bundler for the Obama administration. In the last quarter of 2011 and in the first quarter of 2012, Mr Corzine was listed as bringing in more than half a million dollars. The Government Accountability Institute reported in July of 2012 that MF Global was a client of Attorney General Eric Holder and Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer’s law firm, Covington & Burling. Breitbart News discovered that the attorney representing MF Global Treasurer Edith O’Brien is Reid Weingarten, Eric Holder’s “best friend” and his own personal attorney. Weingarten and Holder also co-founded a non-profit together called the "See Forever Foundation".
Summary of Events
Jon Corzine became CEO and Chairman of the Board in March 2010, at a time when MF Global had reported losses for five straight quarters. He transformed what had been a longstanding FCM combined with a BD into a full-service global investment bank.
While Mr. Corzine acted as CEO of the entire MF Global enterprise, he also traded actively on its behalf through a specially designated account. Among the lines of business that Mr. Corzine built up to attempt to improve profitability at MF Global was the trading of a portfolio of European sovereign debt securities. These trades provided paper profits booked at the time of the trades, but presented substantial liquidity risks including significant margin demands that put further stress on MF Global’s daily cash needs.
The European sovereign debt trades were structured as “repos to maturity” (“RTMs”). In these transactions, sovereign debt securities purchased by MFGI at a discounted price were repoed back to its affiliate, MFGUK. Because the termination of the RTMs between MFGI and MFGUK was the same date as the maturity of the sovereign bond, accounting rules allowed MF Global to account for the RTM as a sale, and therefore record an immediate gain on the sale, while removing the transactions from MF Global’s consolidated balance sheet. The corresponding repo transaction between MFGUK and LCH.Clearnet, however, was for a term two days shorter than the maturity date of the underlying bonds. This disparity meant that MFGUK — which turned to MFGI to provide funding — would ultimately have to finance the sovereign bonds for the two-day window, thus increasing the amount of cash MFGI needed to maintain the RTM portfolio. In addition to this liquidity risk as between MFGI and MFGUK, MFGI continued to bear the risk of default of the bonds themselves. By the terms of an agreement between MFGI and MFGUK, MFGI received only 20% of the profit on the trades while 80% was allocated to MFGUK.
Because the sovereign debt portfolio consisted of sovereign bonds issued primarily by European nations experiencing severe financial distress (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), the trades presented arbitrage opportunities arising from fluctuations in the yield curve, interest rate futures, and foreign exchange rates, as well as price discrepancies in the sovereign debt sector. MF Global’s investment in sovereign debt peaked at nearly $7 billion (net) in October 2011, and still stood at nearly $6 billion as of the filing date of the bankruptcy. As early as May 2010, the Chief Risk Officer at the time, Michael Roseman, began expressing concerns regarding liquidity risk of the RTM portfolio, which reportedly led to his termination in January of 2011. As the Board and management were aware, the exposure from this portfolio was the equivalent of 14% of MF Global’s assets as of September 30, 2011, and was more than four-and-a-half times MF Global’s total equity, a level that was orders of magnitude greater than the relative exposure at other, larger financial institutions.
The first fiscal year under Jon Corzine’s leadership and new strategy resulted in somewhat improved, though still consistently unprofitable, financial performance for both Holdings and MFGI.
Over the same period of time, the balance sheet consistently showed MF Global as a highly leveraged organization. Its ratio of total liabilities to equity went from 43:1 as of March 31, 2010 to 28:1 as of March 31, 2011 - an improved, but still high, ratio. Unfortunately, these improvements did not meet the rating agencies’ expectations for the company to generate annual pre-tax revenues of at least $200 million in order to maintain an investment grade rating. Thus, further measures were taken to attempt to generate profitability.
In August of 2011, because of concerns about MF Global’s exposure to sovereign debt, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) required MFGI to record additional capital charges to reflect risks associated with the European sovereign debt portfolio. The increased capital charges meant that, in FINRA’s view, MFGI had a net capital deficiency as of July 31, 2011, and MFGI had to re-state its financial results in its July 2011 Financial and Operational Combined Uniform (“FOCUS”) report. As a result, MFGI underwent a $183 million capital infusion to satisfy the increased minimum net capital threshold under SEC uniform net capital Rule 15c3-1.
The underlying liquidity problems at MF Global, however, did not commence in the fall of 2011. Rather, liquidity had been a cause for concern before and throughout Mr. Corzine’s tenure at MF Global, yet systems and tools that would enable accurate real time monitoring of liquidity were never implemented. While MFGI’s proprietary securities business had previously generated enough liquidity to support its daily cash needs, that had changed by 2011. To make matters worse, relevant employees had fragmented reporting relationships and transaction approval authority, and in some cases these employees were new to their positions in the spring and summer of 2011. Liquidity concerns grew especially acute during the summer of 2011. For example, the Assistant Treasurer wrote in an August 11 email that she had “to spend hours every day shuffling cash and loans from entity to entity.” Regardless of whether Mr. Corzine’s bet on European sovereign debt would ultimately have been profitable, in the short term, MF Global became increasingly vulnerable to the developments that ensued in the fall of 2011. Risk and perception of risk quickly turned MF Global’s longstanding liquidity problems into a crisis for which it had neither the tools nor the emergency resources to withstand.
One of the sources of liquidity that MF Global considered tapping to help satisfy ever-increasing liquidity demands of the proprietary securities business was the perceived “excess” funds in customer accounts at the FCM. While an FCM must segregate customer funds from proprietary funds, some confusion and differences of opinion existed within MF Global regarding the extent to which excess funds might be available to meet liquidity needs across the MF Global enterprise. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) requires that customer funds be kept in “Customer Segregated” or “Foreign Secured” accounts (collectively “Customer Accounts”). CFTC regulations provide for Customer Segregated accounts or “4d accounts” to hold the property of customers trading on domestic exchanges, and for Foreign Secured accounts, or “30.7 accounts,” to hold customer property of customers trading on foreign exchanges. The regulated customer funds in the Customer Accounts were not to be used for other purposes.
The regulations for Customer Segregated accounts require a daily accounting of the net liquidation value of the customer funds in the account (the “Net Liquidating Method”). CFTC regulations, however, did not require that all customer funds necessarily be maintained on a dollar-by-dollar basis in the Foreign Secured accounts. Instead, unlike Customer Segregated accounts (for trades on domestic exchanges), the CFTC regulations allowed an “Alternative Method” for calculating whether Foreign Secured accounts were in regulatory compliance even though less than all customer funds deposited for trading on foreign exchanges might actually be deposited in Foreign Secured accounts. MFGI used this “Alternative Method,” and during the month of October 2011, the amount of “Regulatory Excess” — the average amount of customer funds in excess of the regulatory requirement under the Alternative Method (but not the Net Liquidating Method) — was approximately $1 billion. Some at MF Global considered the Regulatory Excess to be a potential source of funds for intraday, or even overnight, transfers to fund the non-FCM activities of MF Global, although others were of the view that the Regulatory Excess would still have to be “locked up” for the benefit of customers. Finally, since the CFTC required that the calculations be done “as of the close of business each day,” questions existed as to whether funds needed to be “locked up” for the benefit of customers intraday as well.
CFTC regulations allow an FCM to deposit its own funds in the Customer Accounts as the FCM deems necessary to prevent Customer Accounts from becoming undersegregated, and, conversely, to withdraw its own funds for proprietary use. MFGI referred to Firm funds kept in Customer Accounts, including funds that were swept in each night, as the “Firm Invested in Excess.” This excess had the beneficial result of acting as a cushion to prevent shortfalls in customer funds owing to changing margin requirements resulting from daily market movements. The benefit of having such funds as a cushion would be achieved, however, only as long as funds removed from those accounts for proprietary activity were limited to the Firm invested in Excess, the amount above the level that was needed to satisfy obligations to customers on a net basis.
As MF Global’s liquidity needs intensified, senior management looked increasingly to the FCM as a source of liquidity for the non-FCM business. For example, in July 2011, senior management proposed that the cash-starved proprietary securities business borrow $250 million on a regular overnight basis from the Regulatory Excess. After consultation with outside counsel, the North American CFO opposed the proposal on the ground that it would create undue risk to customers’ funds. In early August, this proposal was dropped, and thereafter only Firm Invested in Excess was supposed to be available for overnight transfer from the FCM.
Firm Invested in Excess funds were, however, allowed to be used to fund MF Global’s proprietary activities both overnight and during the day, and it appears that part of the Regulatory Excess was, at times, also used for intraday funding of the non-FCM business. When MF Global’s proprietary trading gave rise to a need for additional liquidity, Operations in New York would request what they referred to colloquially as an intraday “loan” actually, not a true loan but simply a transfer of funds from the Treasury Department in Chicago. The Customer Segregated or Foreign Secured accounts at the FCM were at times tapped to fund these transfers. Because compliance with the CFTC regulations was computed as of the close of business, as long as the transfers were returned before the end of each day, some MFGI employees did not consider the transfers to have any regulatory implications, although the CFTC has stated that FCMs must be in regulatory compliance at all times. By the summer of 2011, however, what had previously been relatively small, intermittent intraday transfers from the FCM to New York, became nearly a daily event in increasingly greater amounts. In addition, transfers from the FCM to Operations in New York were kept overnight or longer, presumably with the intention that any overnight transfers would be limited to the Firm Invested in Excess.
The spring and summer of 2011 also saw a change in how MFGI funded securities customers’ requests to withdraw their funds. Historically, MF Global’s proprietary securities trading business had generated sufficient funds to send wires to customers as needed. At some point in the second half of 2011, however, the Treasury Department in Chicago began to process the wires to securities customers, and needed to draw on funds from the FCM accounts, including the Foreign Secured accounts, in order to fund those wires. The weekly SEC Rule 15c3-3 calculation for securities was performed each Monday as of the close of business the previous Friday. (See Section III.A.2, infra.) It was contemplated that the SEC Rule 15c3-3 requirement would be reduced to reflect the funds that had been withdrawn by securities customers during the week, and that the next calculation would permit the release of funds that had been locked up so they could be returned to the FCM accounts. Before the end of October, this funding of securities customer wires by the FCM should not have put customer funds at significant risk, because the typical weekly amount of such wires was less than $60 million, an amount that was generally within the Firm Invested in Excess, and the funds were generally returned to the FCM.
Although MF Global disclosed the net capital deficit and the $183 million capital infusion required by FINRA on September 1, this event did not garner much national attention until an October 17 report in The Wall Street Journal, after which events rapidly came to a head. On October 24, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded MF Global’s credit rating to near-junk status. Then, on October 25, MF Global held its third quarter earnings call during which it announced the $119 million write-off of deferred tax assets (“DTAs”), signaling increased doubt about near-term prospects for profitability. The next day, S&P put MF Global on “Credit Watch Negative,” and on October 27, Moody’s cut MF Global to junk status. Together with the downgrades of MF Global’s credit rating and growing concerns about the large sovereign debt portfolio, this news contributed to a major loss of market confidence.
A classic run on the bank ensued as customers sought to withdraw their property from their MFGI accounts, while counterparties and exchanges demanded increased collateral or margin. At the same time, other counterparties declined to do business with MF Global altogether, leaving it with illiquid securities that it could not finance in the repo market or elsewhere. The rush to meet funding needs for collateral, margin and customer liquidations led to billions of dollars in securities sales, draws on credit facilities, and a web of inter-company transactions across MF Global affiliates. MF Global’s computer systems and employees had difficulty keeping up with the unprecedented volume of transactions. Some transactions were recorded erroneously or not at all. So-called “fail” transactions, where either the buyer or seller failed to deliver the cash or the security, respectively, were more than five times greater than the normal volume that week. It was, in the words of one former MF Global executive, a “liquidity asphyxiation.”
These events during the final week of MF Global’s operations increased the demands to use FCM funds to meet liquidity needs elsewhere in the enterprise. Most significantly, on October 26, there was an unprecedented intraday transfer of $615 million from the FCM to fund proprietary securities trading, an amount that was not returned to the FCM before the close of business (although $325 million was put in a BNYM account). Although some of this transfer was ultimately repaid, MFGI was out of regulatory compliance with respect to Customer Segregated funds on October 26, and remained so through October 31. At the same time, MFGI was advising customers that it was “holding all customer cash and collateral in CFTC Rule 1.25 and Rule 30.7 - Customer Segregation [accounts],” implying that 30.7 funds were subject to the same segregation requirements as 4d funds. To make matters worse, on October 28, MF Global personnel made a $175 million transfer from FCM customer funds to MFGUK, to clear an overdraft balance at JPMorgan Chase in London.
Before a transfer was made on the morning of October 31 — when certain funds that had been locked up for securities customers pursuant to SEC Rule 15c3-3 were transferred to the FCM — the shortfall resulting from transfers from the FCM amounted to approximately $900 million. Contrary to some public reports, the shortfall of customer property at MFGI was not caused by direct investment of customer funds in sovereign debt or even by losses on proprietary investments such as the sovereign debt. Rather, the actions of management and other employees, resulted in FCM customer property being used during the liquidity crisis to fund the extraordinary liquidity drains elsewhere in the business, including margin calls on the European sovereign debt positions.
Note: this text was taken from the trustees report.
On November 1, the CME group stated that it was carrying out an investigation on the unfolding bankruptcy at MF Global. CME’s chief executive, Craig Donohue, stated in a phone call that the scope of the violations was not known, but that an investigation was indeed ongoing.
While we are unable to determine the precise scope of the firm’s violation at this time, we are investigating the circumstances of the firm’s failure.
Corzine Congressional Testimony
Senator Corzine agreed to testify in January of 2012, hoping that the time would give him a chance to go over documents to help figure out where the money went. However, Congress subpeonaed him and he testified on December 8, 2011. He asserted that he simply had no idea where the money went.
The video below shows Governor Corzine's prepared remarks. This CSPAN video shows his full testimony with questions.
CME Chief Congressional Testimony
Just days after Governor Corzine's testimony, chief executive of CME Group Terrence Duffy asserted in testimony that an employee of MF Global told a CME auditor that Mr Corzine was aware that the transfer was from segregated accounts.
Mr. Corzine was aware because our employee had heard this, on the phone—‘Send back 175’ — and said he was aware of this loan.
The only thing I can tell you [is] that MF Global transferred customer money to its broker dealer, and that Mr. Corzine was aware of the loans being made from segregated accounts
JP Morgan Returns $160 Million
On May 18, 2012 JP Morgan returned $160 million to the trustees for MF Global. These funds were not part of the transfers that were made to JP Morgan as the MF Global collapsed.
JP Morgan Returns $600 Million
On June 1, 2012 the Wall street journal reported that JP Morgan had returned as much as $600 million to the trustees and owners of the customer accounts.
In June of 2012, the trustees for MF Global released a report. As part of that report looking into the $1.6 billion in customer funds missing from MF Global, the trustees found that Mr Corzine knowingly used hundreds of millions of dollars from customer segregated accounts to cover margin calls from JP Morgan.
Specifically, the report claims that on October 28, 2011 MF Global was short money in its JPMorgan accounts in London, and JP Morgan’s Donna Dellosso, a ChiefRisk Officer Managing Director at JPM, called MF Global CEO Jon Corzine about the overdraft issue. That same day, Corzine instructed MF Global’s Edith O’Brien, the brokerage’s former assistant treasurer to wire JPM money to clear the overdraft.
Complying with Mr Corzine's request, Mrs O'Brien wired $200 million from the JPM Customer Trust Account to the Treasury House Account and wired 175 million from the Treasury House Account to a account at JPM London. When Mrs Dellosso followed up with her team at JPM to confirm that the money had been received, she learned that the initial $200 million was transferred from the JPM Customer Trust Account. Ms. Dellosso then informed Mr. Zubrow that MFGI had in fact made the transfers to cover the overdraft, but that the funding for the transfer came from a Customer Segregated account.
Dellosso reached out to Corzine and asked for written confirmation that the transferred money came from its own funds and did not belong to MF Global clients. At that time, Laurie Ferber, the General Counsel at MF Global got involved and claimed that the request for the signature was too broad and refused to sign it. JP Morgan then took the money without the signature.
At the time of the report, JPM had returned approximately $89.2 million in customer property and $518.4 million in non-segregated unallocated MF Global assets.
Lobbying the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
A PBS documentary called "The Six Billion Dollar Bet" showed the situation surrounding MF Global. It discusses the bets that Corzine made on the sovereign European debt, the risks of those bets and the potential that Corzine used customer funds to cover these bets. The documentary also covers the fact that Corzine himself lobbied the CFTC to prevent making the internal repo illegal. The section of text below shows the desire of other traders to disclose those bets to the shareholders, and the possibility that customer funds were used earlier than we now believe.
Obama Ad for Jon Corzine
During the 2010 election, an ad was made for Governor Corzine crediting him with aiding the economy and being a big player in the 2009 stimulus plan. The ad features President Obama at numerous speeches touting Governor Corzine's economic prowess.
Corzine and the Stimulus
In 2010, when Governor Corzine was running for re-election against Chris Christie, the Obama administration spoke often in support of Governor Corzine. However, this support extended beyond the backing of his efforts as Governor of New Jersey as both the President and Vice President asserted that when the economic crisis hit in 2008, Jon Corzine was the first person they called to get advice.
 Website: Wikipedia Article: Jon Corzine Author: NA Accessed on: 09/10/2012
 Website: Wikipedia Article: MF Global Author: NA Accessed on: 09/10/2012
 Website: Forbes.com Article: Jon Corzine: Criminal Or Just Plain Old-Fashioned Stupid? Author: Richard Finger Accessed on: 09/10/2012
 Website: The Wall Street Journal Article: MF Global Collapses as Books Questioned Author: NA Accessed on: 09/10/2012
 Website: New York Times Article: Corzine and MF Global Regulators Testify Author: Ben Protess Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: Hot Air Article: Witness: Corzine knew that customer funds flew Author: ED MORRISSEY Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: PBS Article: Six Billion Dollar Bet - Video Author: NA Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: Bloomberg Article: Tiny Rule Change at Heart of MF Global Failure Author: William D. Cohan Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: New York Times Article: CME Investigating MF Global Author: BEN PROTESS AND MICHAEL J. DE LA MERCED Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: New York Times Article: MF Global Trustee Gets $168 Million From JPMorgan Author: AZAM AHMED AND BEN PROTESS Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: Washington Post Article: CME chief: Corzine was aware of customer funds transfer Author: Suzy Khimm Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: Forbes.com Article: JPMorgan's Other Messy Problem: MF Global's Missing Money Author: Halah Touryalai Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: Wall Street Journal Article: MF's Bank Returns $600 Million Author: AARON LUCCHETTI Accessed on: 09/11/2012
 Website: The Weekly Standard Article: Jon Corzine Still Bundling for Obama Author: Daniel Halper Accessed on: 09/11/2012